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THE CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL NORMS TO THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL 
CRISIS: A SYSTEMIC ACTOR FOCUSED MODEL AND PROPOSAL FOR 
REGULATORY CHANGE 
Manuscript Type: Conceptual 
Research Question/Issue: Conventional regulatory reforms of the financial system focus on 
standard economic assumptions of self-interested, rational actors. The Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC) and similar financial failures highlight there are limits to this approach. Instead we use 
a norm-based (or soft law) perspective to examine how the systemic problems underlying the 
GFC lay not so much in neo-classical economic assumptions of self-interest, but in unchecked 
financial innovation exploited by norms of buyer beware and ratings agency reliance among 
market participants. Fueled by sector-wide remuneration practices, these norms created 
information asymmetries that fundamentally undermined the integrity of the market.  
Research Findings/Insights: We present a model that highlights how investment banks, as 
professional service firms, have superior information to their clients. This presents an 
information asymmetry problem whereby they can exploit the market norm of caveat emptor 
(buyer beware) when developing innovative financial transactions. We propose a model 
highlighting how flawed financial innovation can lead to widespread, systemic problems of 
assessing and pricing risk because market participants can actively develop and promote 
flawed transactions. This problem is exacerbated where there is an over-reliance on credit 
ratings agencies (due to the high information and search costs facing buyers) and a reduced 
emphasis on director fiduciary duties in financial Special Purpose Entities. 
Theoretical/Academic Implications: Social norms that underpin financial markets are 
central to market regulation. Our approach provides a reexamination of the often 
unquestioned use of universal norms for differing market transactions in the financial sector. 
Researchers need to explore the interaction between social norms and market contexts (such 
as financial innovation) to better understand the behavior of financial markets. We contend 
that a mismatch between norms and market mechanisms can lead to significant unintended 
outcomes. Our approach of combining soft law (norms) and hard law (regulation) approaches 
to regulation provides added insights into agency, stewardship and institutional theories.  
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Regulators need to understand norms and financial market 
contexts to develop better legislative interventions. Specifically, differentiating between 
transaction types in financial markets will address the problems associated with information 
and search costs facing buyers of flawed financial innovation.  We also provide proposals for 
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policy makers seeking to embed accountability for risk taking across the key participants in 
the financial system to minimize market distortions in the majority of the financial sector. 
Keywords:  Legal Effectiveness; Governmental Protection; Hard versus soft law.
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INTRODUCTION 
Regulating market bubbles remains one of the most challenging tasks facing 
governments. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) is the latest in a long tradition of financial 
bubbles leading to public outcry and extensive regulatory intervention (Ferguson, 2008).  The 
consequent flurry of regulatory reforms focuses on myriad issues: revised prudential 
standards, new regulatory bodies, increased transparency, limits on certain activities and 
trades and so on (Conyon, Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos & Murphy, 2011). Yet despite public 
outcry and government reaction, financial sector behavior appears largely unchanged 
(Knyght, Kakabadse, Kakabadse, & Kouzmin, 2011). 
It is timely, therefore, to question how we analyze bubbles and design regulatory 
interventions. Overcoming the usual cycle of crisis and reactionary regulation (Clarke, 2004) 
requires an approach that allows for an evolution in products and financial institutional forms 
that is sure to occur. Without a flexible approach, products and actors will develop ways to 
circumvent rules too specifically targeted to the last financial disaster.  
Traditional economic assumptions of rational self-interest are the focus of current 
financial market reforms (e.g. Cukierman, 2011). This is despite significant evidence that 
human behavior is not uniform, but various with social norms (e.g. Akerlof, 2007; Güth, 
Schmittberger, & Schwarz, 1982; Kandori, 1992). Ignoring the underlying social norms 
present in financial markets risks ignoring the generative mechanisms behind the GFC, 
particularly when norms vary between nations and markets (e.g. Boytsun, Deloof & 
Matthyssens, 2011; Stafsudd, 2009). Instead, effective financial market regulation requires 
policy makers to target human behavior by understanding the context and nature of relevant 
participant norms. In the case of the GFC, we argue that flawed financial innovation and the 
market norm of caveat emptor (or buyer beware) provided the opportunity for market 
participants to unfairly exploit information asymmetries. Additional social norms governing 
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remuneration systems and ratings agency reliance encouraged this exploitative behavior to 
spread through the financial network, resulting in unintended systemic risk.  
We commence by outlining the growing evidence of relationships between formal and 
informal institutions and market behavior, focusing particularly on the neglected area of 
social norms. We then provide a norm-based explanation of the GFC by examining the role of 
a key financial instrument, the Collateralized Debt Obligation (CDO). Based on this 
explanation, we develop a model comprising six propositions that seeks to explain the 
development of systemic risk during the GFC from a norms based perspective. We conclude 
with the implications of our model, including some suggested regulatory interventions.  
LAW, SOCIAL NORMS AND MARKET BEHAVIOR 
Markets of all kinds have become important vehicles for economic growth and are 
widely lauded as superior to command and control systems. Staggering efficiency gains made 
possible by these self-organizing systems (Leibenstein, 1966) have led many to adopt a 
philosophy that favors market freedom over government regulation (e.g. Friedman & 
Friedman, 1980). Yet many commentators highlight that this philosophical position can lead 
to insufficient regulation, particularly when based on “utopian economics” (Cassidy, 2009: 
17). It is becoming increasingly apparent that standard economic analysis is only useful where 
people’s “preferences correspond to economists’ typical descriptions of them” (Akerlof, 
2007:6, original emphasis). Consequently, interest in norms and other non-traditional 
motivations within mainstream economics continues to grow (e.g. Akerlof & Kranton, 2005; 
Bandiera, Rasul & Barankay, 2005; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000a,b; McFadden, 2006).  
Markets do not emerge naturally in isolation from society and the rule of law, but rather 
require a strong set of institutions to provide the “rules of the game in a society or, more 
formally, …the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction” (North, 1990:3). 
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These institutions are both formal (e.g. legislation, regulation, regulatory bodies, etc.) and 
informal (e.g. conventions, codes of behavior, etc.) that together provide a framework for 
human behavior. While there is no doubt that formal institutions (often termed hard 
regulation) shape market participant behavior they are most successful when they reinforce 
and influence informal institutions, particularly social norms (often referred to as soft 
regulation). Effective market reform requires an alignment between formal institutions and 
the “rules of conduct that constrain self-interested behavior but are not enforced by any 
authoritative body that can impose a sanction” – social norms (Coffee, 2001: 2171) because 
the pattern of actors’ behaviors is sustained by the approval or disapproval of a social group 
(Alm, McClelland & Schulze, 1999).  
While reform has focused on changing formal institutions (laws, regulation, oversight 
bodies and so on), little if any attention has been paid to social norms. Consequently, reforms 
largely ignore “informal protection...where the community provides efficient informal 
incentives...and punishment for deviant behavior” (Boytsun et. al. 2011: 55) irrespective of 
formal institutions. In the following sections we use evidence from studies of national and 
regional differences in norms to highlight how the relationship between informal institutions 
and market behavior before applying this logic to an analysis of the GFC.  
Markets Need a Norm-Based Social Framework to Operate 
Economics is peppered with seminal advice arguing that people and entities make 
decisions within a social framework that shapes behavior. For instance, Smith’s (1776) 
support of markets was based on the observation that individuals have a fundamental and 
unselfish interest in others’ happiness and pleasure. This shared “sympathy of sentiments” 
develops into an unconscious system of standards (e.g see Younkins, 2008). Posner’s analysis 
of market practices extends this view by highlighting that accepted standards need not be 
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positive. For instance, people who “are unusually ‘fair’ will avoid (or, again, be forced out of) 
roughhouse activities - including highly competitive businesses...” (Posner, 1997: 1570). 
Thus, commentators and scholars emphasize the importance of an appropriate moral 
framework to underpin effective market governance (e.g. Dawson, 2004). 
Traditional economic assumptions about market participant motivations (i.e. that 
individuals pursue rational self-interest) largely ignore the social forces that can contribute to 
market behavior (Akerlof, 2007). While self-interest is a major factor in individual decision-
making, there is a distinguished research tradition highlighting that self-interest is contextual 
rather than universal. People do not follow “[a]lmost all economic models [that] assume that 
all people are exclusively pursuing their material self-interest and do not care about “social” 
goals per se” (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999: 817).  
Research into the relationship between rewards, sanctions and behavior reveals a 
complex relationship not provided for in standard economic analysis (Festré, 2010). Seminal 
research on the ultimatum game (Guth, Schmittberger, & Schwarze, 1982) shows individuals’ 
perceptions of fairness cause them to deviate from rational self-interest in their decision-
making irrespective of culture, time period and payout levels (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999). Similar 
evidence suggests that formal institutions such as regulation are more likely to succeed when 
actors view a sanction as a moral issue rather than a cost; thus, imposing a fine on parents 
who picked their child up late from day care decreased compliance. Parents’ views on abiding 
by the rule changed from a moral imperative to a compliance cost  (Gneezy & Rustichini, 
2000a). Similarly, rewarding prosocial behavior with extrinsic rewards can reduce preferred 
behavior; compensating people for donating blood can crowd-out intrinsic motivation 
(Titmuss, 1970; Mellstrom & Johannesson, 2008) or providing a share in donations to charity 
collectors can decrease the total collected (e.g. Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000b). These insights 
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match some early analysis of the GFC that highlighted how decision-making deviated from 
standard economic assumptions (e.g. Rost & Osterloh, 2010). 
Studies of national corporate governance systems provide an interesting starting point 
for understanding how formal (e.g. black letter or hard law) and informal institutions (e.g. 
social norms or soft law) within a market affect actor behavior (North, 1990). Regulation 
reform in a national setting requires an understanding of both factors as reform “focused 
solely on legal rules is likely to be limited at best” (Boytsun, et al., 2011: 42). Reform 
following the GFC is analogous to the national setting as the neglect of relevant social norms 
can undermine regulatory interventions if market participant behavior is not modeled 
accurately (Coffee, 2001).  
Nation-focused research has clearly established a link between national norms and 
economic outcomes. For instance, at a country level the norm of openness is positively 
associated with the development of capital markets. Similarly, norms associated with 
religiosity are associated with capital market development (Stulz & Williamson, 2003), 
economic growth (Barro & McCleary, 2003) as well as attitudes positively affecting 
economic growth (Guiso, Sapienza & Zingles, 2004). Similar to norms, country level trust 
and social capital have been correlated with national rates of growth (Knack & Keefer, 1997), 
the presence of large organisations (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1997), 
lending behavior (Besley & Coate, 1995) and stock market participation (Hong, Kubik & 
Stein, 2004). Clearly social norms and the associated levels of national trust affect economic 
outcomes and market behaviors. 
Social norms do not replace formal legal structures but rather operate in parallel with 
sanction-backed rules. For instance, in contrast to many developing nations, Sweden provides 
no evidence of widespread tunneling (i.e. expropriation of benefits by a dominant 
shareholder). This is despite formal institutions that allow dual class shares, pyramiding and 
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cross-holding - all factors normally associated with the phenomenon (Agnblad Berglöf, 
Högfeldt, & Svancar, 2001; Holmén & Högfeldt, 2004). Stafsudd (2009) attributes the lack of 
tunneling to Sweden’s social norms including higher levels of business honesty. She contends 
informal institutions explain the advanced nature and behaviors of the Swedish capital market 
as formal institutions and sanctions are only necessary when these social norms fail.  
The effect of social norms is not confined to the national level and, although the 
research agenda is less well developed, there is clear evidence that social norms operate at a 
market and/or regional level. Thus, worker behavior within a single country and industry can 
vary with region-based social norms - for instance there is greater shirking in Southern 
(compared with Northern) Italian banks (Ichino & Maggi, 2000). More strikingly, Guiso et al. 
(2004) report that New York's diamond traders do not use contracts as they have sufficient 
trust resulting from common membership in the Jewish orthodox sect. On a broader scale, 
financial development is more advanced in parts of Italy where trust is high (the North) than 
where it is not (the South) (Guiso et al, 2004). In summary, social norms within markets 
complement formal institutions and legal sanctions are unlikely to function unless backed by 
social norms. Instead, formal institutions are often a reflection of extant social norms that 
preceded them (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004). 
The financial sector meets the necessary conditions required for norms to matter. The 
sector is a social system (e.g. Mizruchi & Stearns, 1994) that satisfies sociological definitions 
of community (i.e. social interaction, co-location and common ties (Hillery,1955)). The US 
tradition of market participants serving in important policy and regulatory positions only 
strengthens this conclusion. Just as informal governance mechanisms are thought to be more 
important to small countries (Stafsudd, 2009), so too in finance. Strong, close network ties 
allow for “[r]epeated interactions” where actors are “more likely to enforce social control” 
(p.67).  
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The spread of social norms through social networks and its subsequent effect on 
behavior is the subject of recent advances in fields as diverse as medicine, business and 
information technology. For instance, a series of 32-year longitudinal studies have highlighted 
how position in a social network is related to the later incidence of obesity (Christakis & 
Fowler, 2007), smoking cessation (Christakis & Fowler, 2008), happiness (Fowler & 
Christakis, 2008), as well as altruistic versus self-interested behavior (Fowler & Christakis, 
2010). An actor’s direct and indirect contacts are clearly related to behavior and attitudes 
through a hypothesized change in social norms (Fowler & Christakis, 2010). 
Taken together, evidence suggests that social norms matter to market behavior, and they 
are likely to matter more to the financial community. Since finance involves a dense, tight 
social network (Keister, 2002) and because financial contracts rely on the trust that another 
party will fulfill their end of the bargain, social norms are critical to understanding participant 
behavior within the sector (Guiso et al, 2004). 
Norms Work with and Reinforce Formal Institutions to Provide the Market Framework 
Social norms affect economic behavior and market outcomes not in isolation but in 
concert with formal institutions - both evolve and influence each other to reflect and shape 
community needs and expectations. For instance, the legal principle that shareholders do not 
owe a duty to each other (Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189) has been superseded by 
numerous statutes designed to protect the integrity of the market (e.g. prohibitions on tipping 
off and insider trading (Farrar, 2005)). Sometimes the legislature changes the law to influence 
societal norms (e.g. modification of domestic violence laws); at other times the law is 
preceded by developments in societal norms and acts to codify these social norms (e.g. the 
prohibition on smoking in buildings in some countries or even states but not in others (Kahan, 
2000)). 
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In a national setting, Roe (2002) argues cultural constraints provide boundaries for 
behavior in economic systems. Thus, Swedish society’s lower outrage threshold around CEO 
pay provides a dampening effect on levels of executive pay compared to the US (Stafsudd, 
2009). In this way, social norms can result in “‘good’ economic attitudes, and these, in turn, 
cause ‘good’ corporate governance patterns” such as transparency and less expropriation 
(Boytsun et. al., 2011:43).  
Yet regulatory responses to the GFC have focused on assumptions of rationality rather 
than a considered study of actor norms. Regulatory solutions address problems based on 
curbing rational self-interest, including (1) moral hazard in risk-taking (e.g. being too big to 
fail), (2) planned and logical risk ring-fencing (e.g. quarantining trading from banking such as 
under the Volcker rule), (3) improving transparency and regulation of derivative trading as 
well as (4) remuneration claw backs to decrease gaming and risk-taking. These interventions 
have been made “on the run” with little reflection on the systemic issues involved in the crisis 
(Davis, 2010b: 125). As a result, the recent US legislation Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act (H.R. 4173) has 243 rulemakings and requires 67 studies to be 
conducted (DavisPolk, 2010). In so doing, the interventions risk treating the symptom rather 
than the cause as well as imposing unnecessary costs on the economy (Conyon, et al., 2011). 
In contrast, there is significant evidence that “[i]nformal institutions...exercise an 
independent direct influence” on behavior in corporations (Boytsun, et al., 2011: 43). If, as 
national data suggest, the causes of the GFC are linked with social norms within financial 
sector networks, current regulatory efforts need to move beyond simplistic behavioral 
assumptions (Akerlof, 2007). If problems of transparency and excessive risk taking are 
symptoms not causes of the social norms underlying the GFC, then a recurrence of GFC 
conditions is almost guaranteed (Clarke, 2004). Addressing this problem requires an 
understanding of how social norms may have contributed to the latest financial meltdown.  
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THE GFC - AN ANALYSIS AND NORM BASED EXPLANATION 
Understanding the GFC is difficult, and we acknowledge that more comprehensive 
analyses have been and will continue to be made (e.g. Cassidy, 2009; Stiglitz, 2010) . The 
crisis involved many different actors in sometimes apparently unrelated transaction chains 
with end users removed by several layers from the commercial financial markets (see figure 
1). Despite this complexity, it is possible to identify the generative mechanisms behind the 
GFC by analyzing a single product, the CDO. In so doing, we are not positing that a single 
product was responsible for the GFC, but rather that by examining the use of that product we 
can provide significant insights into the GFC’s causes. 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Financial innovation (i.e.  “new securities, financial structures or other innovative 
solutions to meet market participants’ needs” (Moles & Terry, 1997: para. 1)) lies at the 
center of the GFC transaction chain. While home owners borrowed beyond their means 
(Ferguson, 2008), mortgage brokers engaged in unethical and illegal practices (Cassidy, 
2009) and various other parties demonstrated questionable behavior, the chain of events was 
stimulated by financial innovation.  Similarly, we acknowledge that macro economic 
structures certainly played their part, but the central cause of the GFC was the repackaging of 
doubtful loans in innovative ways by investment banks. Once these instruments gained ratings 
agencies’ approval they stimulated compelling incentives for retail lenders to relax lending 
practices, implement doubtful remuneration practices and take on high-risk borrowers. 
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CDOs - An Example of the Dangers in Financial Innovation 
The use of CDOs leading up to the GFC provides an insightful example of the risks of 
financial innovation and how this innovation can trigger systemic failure (Partnoy, 2009). A 
basic CDO is an asset-backed security reliant on incoming repayments from loans, bonds or 
other debt. A standard cashflow CDO involves a Special Purpose Entity (SPE) buying debt 
(usually loans or bonds from Banks), splitting the debt into different tranches of quality and 
then on-selling it. Investors can purchase different tranches of the resulting CDO security 
where a tranche is a “slice” of the CDO based on a pre-calculated risk profile; tranches with a 
higher risk profile get a higher return (Smith, 2009). 
Given that this transaction provides (a) no increase in revenue and (b) no overall change 
in default risk for the parties, it is not immediately obvious where the extra value is created. 
Why are people willing to pay more for debt with the same repayment levels and an 
unchanged risk profile?  
The Theoretical Value of CDOs. Skeel and Partnoy (2007) posit that repackaging debt 
into tranches provides market participants with access to a new security type and in doing so 
provides a more complete market.  If underlying investments (whole mortgages) either (1) 
misprice the asset or (2) limit the investor pool, cashflow CDOs will provide real fixed 
income assets that have a higher credit rating than some of the underlying assets. For instance, 
if the ratings agencies’ proprietary methodologies calculate risk more accurately, then value is 
created through financial mathematics, similar to the value created by adoption of derivative 
pricing mechanisms such as the Black-Scholes option pricing model. Alternatively, a CDO 
may create value if it opens access to market participants. For instance, if potential market 
participants are precluded from purchasing a certain class of assets and the CDO repackaging 
overcomes this exclusion, the resulting increase in market depth can add value. Importantly, 
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both of these assumptions rely on valuing risk accurately (see Skeel & Partnoy (2007) for a 
more detailed analysis). 
CDOs - is the Value Illusory? In the lead up to the GFC, CDO creators bought debt, 
restructured it, and then on-sold it at a higher price.  Generating high, ongoing returns from 
this process requires a persistent difference between the prices in the underlying debt market 
and prices in the CDO market. Basic economic theory, however, suggests that arbitrage 
opportunities would disappear as participants in the underlying debt market correct their 
pricing, particularly given the large transaction costs involved in establishing a CDO. 
Continuing arbitrage opportunities breach the “law of one price” (Mankiw, 2008:707) and can 
only persist if there is information asymmetry or regulatory controls.  
In the absence of regulatory controls, persistent above-market returns indicate that the 
underlying financial innovation is flawed. For CDOs there were two key sources of 
information asymmetry that provided the basis for innovation failure: (1) complex pricing 
methodologies and (2) subsequent ratings agency approval. First, the proprietary 
methodologies developed to price CDO risk were “complex, arbitrary, and opaque” providing 
investment banks with “a ratings ‘arbitrage’ opportunity without adding any actual value” 
(Skeel & Partnoy, 2007: 1041). As the market for CDOs experienced rapid growth, CDO 
ratings were based on untested correlation factors within and between markets. This flaw in 
CDO models was highlighted as a cause for concern prior to the meltdown (e.g. CGFS, 2005) 
and explicitly disclosed by the rating agencies (e.g. see Skeel & Partnoy, 2007). Many 
experienced actors were well aware that their innovation was highly speculative.  
The flaw in the creation of these financial instruments was made worse by ratings 
agency reliance (a point to which we return). CDO calculations use ratings provided by the 
agencies instead of direct market feedback to assess underlying asset valuation and risk. By 
using a proxy (i.e. the rating) the creator ignores the ongoing assessment of multiple market 
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participants and this encourages gaming. Each rating (e.g. the rating AAB) is based on a 
collection of underlying of heterogeneous quality. If a financial instrument creator can 
assemble a package of low quality assets from within a class, they stand to make more than if 
they use higher quality assets in the same rating class. While these differences are priced into 
market information, they are not priced into a rating nor the consequent CDO. This leads to a 
race to the bottom (within the various classes of assets) as CDOs become disconnected from 
the underlying markets. 
The divergence of model calculations from underlying valuatiuons created ongoing 
arbitrage opportunities. Additionally, the calculations used in the ratings process are carried 
out by the innovators and merely verified by the rating agency. This provides the conditions 
whereby the person creating the instrument has greater knowledge about its risk than both the 
ratings agency and purchaser, an ideal setting for exploiting an information asymmetry. In 
summary, while there are some logical arguments as to how financial innovation like CDOs 
create value, there are also several major and significant potential failure points. 
MODELING THE DEVELOPMENT OF SYSTEMIC RISK 
The preceding sections provide the elements for developing a model of how social 
norms contributed to systemic risk during the GFC. First, we have highlighted that market 
regulation and government interventions focus on the rational self-interested assumptions of 
economics rather than an assessment of the social norms at work in a market. Second, 
international and regional studies clearly establish that social norms are linked to market 
participant behavior. Third, financial innovation and the resulting information asymmetries 
associated with complex financial products such as CDOs were central to the GFC. In this 
section we synthesize these three points to develop a model of how systemic risk developed 
during the GFC, paying particular attention to the role of market norms. 
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Professional Service Firms - the Driver of Financial Innovation 
The example of CDOs highlights how financial innovation provides the opportunity for 
wealth creation. A new financial instrument that assesses risk better or aids the completion of 
the market will provide above market returns for the users, at least initially (Skeel & Partnoy, 
2007). The market rules prior to the GFC facilitated the rapid growth of financial innovation; 
for instance, figure 2 documents the growth in the sub-prime mortgage market prior to the 
GFC. This figure highlights that the doubling in market share of sub-prime mortgages was 
largely fueled by securitized instruments - those that required financial innovation and 
complex instruments (FCIC, 2011). Similar trends in non-traditional banking led the 
Secretary to the US Treasury to conclude that “[b]y far the most significant event in finance 
during the past decade has been the extraordinary development and expansion of financial 
derivatives” (Greenspan in FCIC, 2011: 48).  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Financial innovation is a product of the human and social capital of its creators. 
Investment banks (the key financial sector innovators during the GFC) supply the human 
capital required to meet the demand of the sector for innovation. Importantly, investment 
banks share the traits of most professional organizations (Hall, 1967; Scott, 1992; Wallace, 
1995) and have long been considered professional services firms (e.g. Sharma, 1997). Their 
employees use their knowledge and skills to advise and construct products for clients (see, for 
example, Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu and Kochhar (2001) for the relationship between human 
capital and professional service firms). Employees also use their social capital to facilitate the 
transactions around those products for the benefit of the firms’ clients. In general, these 
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knowledge workers are appointed and evaluated by their colleagues (i.e. other professionals) 
and their work largely involves independent decision-making around how they do their tasks 
(i.e. autonomy) (Wallace, 1995). Thus, our starting point is to observe that investment banks 
provided the generative mechanism for flawed financial innovation; without the human 
capital in these firms constructing new and untested products, the chain of systemic risk 
would not have emerged (see figure 1). In summary: 
Proposition 1:   The human capital present in professional service firms (i.e. 
investment banks) provided the necessary but not sufficient 
conditions for the GFC through the development of flawed 
financial innovation in a market reliant on social norms rather 
than regulation of flawed innovation. 
The Role of the Caveat Emptor Norm in the GFC 
Employee expertise within professional service firms presents a major conflict for them: 
their superior knowledge and experience creates value for clients but also exposes the client to 
possible exploitation. Society, regulators and the law have long recognized that information 
asymmetry between client and provider based on the provider’s knowledge and expertise is 
problematic (Sharma, 1997). Since buyers of professional services are often unable to assess 
the quality of the advice they receive, these kinds of firms are generally subject to express 
legal and normative regulation (Suddaby, Cooper & Greenwood, 2007). In transaction cost 
terms (Williamson, 1985), the search and information costs associated with advice from 
professional service firms are so high that buyers rely on proxies such as reputation for 
external validation (e.g. Nayyar, 1993; Sharma & Patterson, 2000). In the case of CDO 
development, a purchaser would need to develop their own models and correlation factors 
between debt markets to test the CDO instruments - a prohibitive cost. As a consequence, in 
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most fields of endeavor (e.g. law, accounting, etc.) professional service firms do not operate 
on the principle of caveat emptor (let the buyer beware). Instead, the professional owes a duty 
to their client. 
This problem is recognized in the consumer segment of financial markets where caveat 
emptor has largely been replaced in developed economies with a set of legislation, regulation 
and common law precedent that protects buyers against unfair transactions. In the commercial 
segment of the financial sector, however, caveat emptor remains a basic principle of 
contracting (e.g. in the US see Wade, 1994; in the UK see Norton, 2005). Caveat emptor is a 
principle developed by the common law over centuries that states “a buyer must ascertain the 
good quality of the goods he or she purchases” (Butt, 2004: 64). The only exception occurs 
where the seller has given an express warranty, or where a condition or warranty can be 
implied from the nature and circumstances of the sale (Finnemore & James, 1996). In the 
absence of fraud, the buyer purchases at her/his own risk.  
When caveat emptor was established, the quality of goods was easily assessed and the 
law matched a social norm of taking care when bartering. As goods became increasingly 
complex, however, consumers had difficulty ascertaining their quality and caveat emptor 
“was replaced in the 20th century by a recognizable body of product liability law offering 
protection to those who suffer product-related loss or damage” (Masel, Grant & Vout, 2010: 
33.4.30). This global phenomenon is mirrored in most countries (e.g. see the OECD (2010) 
Committee on Consumer Policy’s guide to the development of consumer regulation). 
The financial sector has not followed this trend, but rather developed into two streams, 
one for consumer transactions and one for commercial transactions. This has led to a 
bifurcation in buyer protection and the relevant social norms. End consumer transactions in 
the financial sector are now often subject to highly complex and detailed regulation designed 
to protect the end user of financial products from unscrupulous sellers (e.g. Tarr, 1980; 2010). 
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Commercial transactions, however, remain based upon a system that allows for the sale of 
risky (and even unsound) assets provided there is sufficient disclosure (Taylor, Pflaum & 
Flesch, 1996). There is no legislative ability to review the merits of an investment, only an 
ability to prosecute for fraud or insufficient disclosure.  There is some understandable logic to 
this approach when applied to securities as distinct from products. The selling of a security 
involves the selling of risk. Under the economic principle of risk and return, the buyer is 
willing to assume greater risk in the expectation of receiving a higher return. To have the 
seller of such a security “guarantee” either the return or remove the risk of failure would 
undermine many benefits of financial markets. 
The continued use of caveat emptor in commercial financial markets rests on two 
unstated assumptions required for equal and shared information between the parties: (1) the 
seller must fully inform the buyer as to the risk profile of the security and (2) the average 
buyer should have the ability to understand the risk profile of the product they are buying 
(e.g. ANZSFRC, 2010). Without these two assumptions, the search and information costs 
become exorbitant and undermine the efficiency of the market transactions; quite simply 
“both monitoring and metering are highly problematic when knowledge-intensive service 
products are involved” (Sharma, 1997: 776).  
The financial innovation that drove the spread of CDOs breaches these assumptions and 
so fails to strike a “balance between caveat emptor and … protection implicit in the current 
…regulatory approach” (Davis, 2010a: para. 14). Investment banks created products based on 
their expertise and then took advantage of the asymmetric information they possessed. 
Investment banks (creators and sellers of the product) would, for instance, simultaneously 
take an undisclosed financial position based on the security failing. This is problematic when 
products are not understood by the participants and/or based on flawed information.  
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Email correspondence within Goldman Sachs provides corroborating evidence for this 
conclusion. Extracts included details of how “two Goldman bankers ... ‘structured like mad 
and traveled the world, and worked their tails off to make some lemonade from some big old 
lemons’” (Phillips, 2010: para. 14). Vice-President Fabrice Tourre boasted he had “managed 
to sell a few Abacus bonds to widows and orphans that I ran into at the airport” (Story, 2010: 
para. 16). These weren’t isolated incidents but part of the management system, evidenced by 
how the firm developed and sold “shitty” deals such as Timberwolf, making that deal in 
particular a top priority for the sales team for at least several weeks (Perton, 2010: para. 2). As 
a result, the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations issued a a rare bipartisan 
declaration that Goldman was selling highly risky securities while betting that these same 
securities would fail (Phillips, 2010).  
The social norm of caveat emptor applied by the investment banks in these instances is 
largely out of step with community expectations and the evolution of consumer protection. In 
a recent open meeting of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), 
Commissioner Aguilar commented that “...market participants would not be able to function, 
much less profit, without the trust of investors and the public as a whole” and that a 
regulatory regime works best when it “prevents misconduct in the first place” (Aguilar, 2010: 
para. 1). Clearly, the SEC is advocating the development of an approach to market 
participation that is founded on the norms of fairness with advisors not exploiting information 
and expertise asymmetries. 
But under current law and market norms operating in the commercial component of the 
financial sector, so long as there is no fraud, there is no breach. The entrenched nature of the 
caveat emptor norm was reflected in the words of Goldman Sachs MD Michael Swenson 
who, despite widespread public backlash, commented that “I do not think that we did 
anything wrong” (Phillips, 2010: para. 7). He is pointing out they deal with sophisticated 
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investors who should be able to make their own assessment of the securities in which they 
trade - and more fool them for not doing so. Thus, we contend that: 
Proposition 2:  The norm of caveat emptor provided a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for the GFC by moderating the relationship between the 
investment banks and flawed innovation. The higher the acceptance 
of caveat emptor the greater the propensity for flawed innovation 
in the financial market. 
As previously explained, the presence of financial innovation does not of itself result in 
systemic risk. Rather systemic risk emerges through information asymmetries, most evident 
when there are persistent profits as a result of market failure for mispriced products. The 
demand side of the market (buyer) remains oblivious to the true risks involved in flawed, 
innovative financial instruments because (1) the caveat emptor norm does not require 
disclosure of the flaws and (2) buyers do not understand the product and its assumptions (a 
factor made worse as a result of ratings reliance, a point to which we return). Consequently, in 
a sign of the failure of the market to detect pricing errors, financial innovators took 
increasingly aggressive “market making” positions based on their inside knowledge (e.g. 
Larson & Weise, 2010a, b).  
Basic economic theory suggests that in an informed, efficient market this would have 
been a temporary effect as the price of securities in the underlying market (for instance, the 
pricing of mortgages in the market underlying CDOs) increases with demand. The continued 
arbitrage opportunities were only possible because of flawed innovation and exploited 
information asymmetry. In contrast, the input markets for the flawed products (in the case of 
CDOs, the mortgage markets) were subject to direct valuation and not reliant on financial 
calculations. They did not rise proportionally despite the increased demand brought on by the 
financial innovation. Thus, an informed input market combined with a misinformed demand 
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sector led to the conditions for an ongoing arbitrage and persistent above-market returns such 
that we propose: 
Proposition 3:  Persistent above-market returns based on flawed financial 
innovation eventuated as the product creators exploited 
information asymmetries under the norms of caveat emptor and 
ratings agency reliance. 
Ratings Reliance as a Norm and Facilitator of the GFC  
A second damaging social norm that magnified the information asymmetry problems 
between creators and buyers was reliance on ratings agencies. In 1936, the Comptroller made 
regulation of US securities dependent on the assessments of rating agencies. Consequently, 
rating agencies have “become deeply embedded in investor culture” (Partnoy, 2009: 438). 
This is despite the original intent of the move. In a speech that foreshadowed the possible 
problems faced today, the Comptroller noted that (O’Connor in Harold, 1938: 32): 
The responsibility for the proper investment of bank funds, now, as in the 
past, rests with the Directors of the institution, and there has been and 
[there] is no intention...to delegate this responsibility to the rating 
agencies, or in any way intimate that this responsibility may be 
considered as having been fully performed by the mere ascertaining that 
a particular security falls within a particular rating classification. 
From a transaction cost perspective, the search and information functions necessary for 
assessing the risk in the transaction were largely outsourced to the ratings agencies. Financial 
products can be opaque and misleading on their face, even to experienced investors (Partnoy, 
2009). Transactions like CDOs involved a specialist advisor (the investment bank) 
constructing the product and then having it verified by a third party (the ratings agencies). 
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This process abdicated critical aspects of the risk assessment to third parties whereby those 
trading did not undertake independent assessments of the credit worthiness of investments; 
instead investors, promoters and governors of the SPEs underpinning the instruments placed 
reliance on credit ratings agencies. These key parties were now one step removed from 
responsibility for the underlying assumptions on which the financial innovation was based. 
This is particularly problematic given that the vendor of the security pays for the rating, not 
the buyer who is likely suffering from the information asymmetry (Partnoy, 2009). 
The social norm of market reliance on ratings agencies is compounded by the evolution 
of the Delaware court’s increasingly narrow view of a director’s fiduciary duties. Directors 
owe a duty of care i.e. to act with skill, judgment, or competence (Bainbridge, 2008; Baxt, 
2005). At first glance, it seems improbable that someone selling or buying a financial product 
without assessing its risk could establish that they were acting with due care, particularly if 
the entire entity they govern (in the case of SPEs) is based on the product. The balance 
between measured risk taking and holding directors and officers accountable for their 
competence is delicate and the Delaware courts have established a preference that 
incompetent managers and directors are not accountable for their failings (Alces, 2010). 
Instead, the courts rely on a procedural test of care (In re Caremark Int‘l, Inc. Derivative 
Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996)) where if:  
a decision [is] substantively wrong...[this] provides no ground for 
director liability…[when] the process employed was either rational or 
employed in a good faith effort to advance corporate interests. 
The business judgment rule supports this position and only requires decisions be made 
on an informed basis (Alces, 2010). Applied to deals such as CDO transactions, the boards 
had a process where two independent experts assessed the financial instruments. Thus, despite 
not exercising any skill, judgment or competence (even over the very foundation of the entity 
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they governed in the case of SPEs), and in direct contrast to the Comptroller’s 1936 intent, 
directors and officers satisfied these lower procedural standards without assessing the risk of 
the products underlying their trades. Quite simply the limits of the methodologies used by 
ratings agencies and the risks involved in instruments like CDOs were not sufficiently 
understood (CGFS, 2008) nor questioned by directors of SPEs. Where ratings agencies’ 
assessments are accurate, this does not cause a problem. However, in the case of flawed 
innovation, it provides a necessary condition for their widespread adoption as the market does 
not self-correct over the short to medium term. Ratings agencies assure buyers that the flawed 
innovation is sound and in so doing prolong the profitability of flawed financial innovation by 
reducing the information and search behavior of the buyers. Thus we propose that: 
Proposition 4:  The social norm of relying on ratings agency assessment of risk 
provided a necessary but not sufficient condition for the GFC by 
moderating the relationship between flawed innovation and 
persistent above-market profits.   
The mechanisms behind the failures in the CDO market are representative of a 
widespread problem; similar logic applies to other innovative and complex financial 
instruments. It is not the particular security or innovation itself that is a problem, but rather 
the unknowns associated with financial innovation that can be exploited by market 
participants with asymmetric information due to the underlying sector norm of buyer beware. 
The conditions making events such as the GFC possible involved complex transactions with 
methodologically questionable assumptions not readily apparent to the buyer or even the 
creator/seller (Partnoy, 2009). The particular focus of our model is presented in Figure 3.  
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 3 about here 
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-------------------------------------------------------------- 
As figure 3 highlights, existing consumer protection legislation protects consumers 
against some flawed innovation within the financial transactions market - and so consumer 
protection does not form part of the generative mechanisms for the GFC. Instead, the source 
of the GFC was flawed financial innovation that arose in the commercial environment where 
the norm of caveat emptor prevailed (the shaded area in Figure 3). As the figure also 
highlights, our focus is not on all financial innovation, but rather the subset of innovation that 
is fundamentally flawed and results in persistent above-market returns in the commercial 
sector. Problems of flawed innovation in the consumer market are best addressed with 
consumer protection legislation, which is already extensive. Our key contention is that the 
social norms of caveat emptor  and ratings reliance allow flawed financial innovation to 
persist in the commercial segment of the financial services market, thus creating systemic 
risk. 
The Reinforcing Role of Remuneration 
Finally, the reward and reinforcement systems in the financial sector are thought to be 
an important contributor to the adoption and spread of social norms driving financial sector 
behavior (Davis, 2010a, b). Incentives and behavior are deeply intertwined (e.g. Gibbons, 
1998) and the difficulty of ensuring that incentives reinforce desired norms and behaviors is 
widely accepted (Kerr, 1975).  
Much of the effort spent in investigating the role of remuneration systems at banks in 
the GFC has concentrated on the remuneration of CEOs and sometimes senior executives 
(e.g. Conyon, et al., 2011; Fahlenbrach & Stulz, 2011); this may have limited application 
when understanding the stability of the financial system. Conventional research is largely 
motivated by an agency theory perspective and seeks to understand if the remuneration for 
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senior executives maximizes shareholder interests through increased risk taking by senior 
management (Eisenhardt, 1989). Regulation of the financial system, however, aims to ensure 
the robustness of the financial system, usually through protecting non-shareholding parties 
such as depositors. The stated (and often unstated) position on remuneration practices is that 
parties other than the shareholders are “uninvited guests” to the pay debate (Conyon et al., 
2011:XX) and so only indirectly addresses the regulation debate.  
Even so, evidence is emerging that remuneration practices exacerbated the potential 
conflict between shareholder interests and systemic stability (Bebchuk & Spamann, 2010; 
Bhagat & Bolton, 2010). For instance Fahlenbrach & Stulz (2011) report evidence of more 
high powered incentivisation in bank CEOs; the wealth of a bank CEO increased $24 for each 
$1,000 of shareholder wealth (more than five times the $4.36 for S&P 500 CEOs as reported 
by Murphy (1999)) and they suffered more severe losses when the firms lost value. At the 
CEO level, increased sensitivity to pay for performance appears to have exacerbated an 
increased risk appetite of bank shareholders (Van Bekkum, 2010) to the detriment of the 
system and exacerbation of the moral hazard associated with bailing out banks.  
On a more general level, the decisions around instruments were not the domain of 
CEOs, but rather traders and middle level managers. For instance the only employee being 
pursued in the infamous Goldman Sachs Abacus 2007-AC1 transaction is a 28 year old mid-
level executive. What is interesting about investment banks is that the highest paid employees 
are often these people (traders and fund managers) and not the senior executives (Westbrook, 
2010). Thus, remuneration practices have deep and wide effects on decision making in the 
firm and the systemic bonus culture of investment banks has persisted post GFC (for instance, 
Goldman Sachs, employee bonuses amounted to $15.3 billion in 2010 - an average of 
$US493,000 per employee). This systemic movement to higher levels of pay most often tied 
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to performance is demonstrated in the comparative growth in financial sector remuneration to 
levels not seen since the Great Depression (see figure 4) (FCIC, 2011). 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 4 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Mid-level managers in investment banks are unlikely to be remunerated on corporate 
wide goals and risk profiles; instead they will be rewarded for their individual performance on 
the instruments they deal with and the markets in which they deal. Consequently, many 
bonuses that caused public outrage were not related to corporate performance, but rather they 
involved rewarding individuals for behavior such as remaining in their position (Murphy, 
2009; Quinn, 2009). An emphasis on output based controls for the professionals such as these 
is thought to increase the opportunistic behavior of the professionals involved (Sharma, 
1997). Thus, we contend that where flawed innovation leads to ongoing above-market returns, 
there will be a rise in remuneration (as a result of the social norms) for those who facilitate 
these transactions such that: 
Proposition 5:  Due to the financial sector’s remuneration norms, persistent 
above-market returns (including those from flawed financial 
products) led to high levels of performance based, individual 
remuneration in the creators of financial products. 
While most commentators see remuneration as a single firm governance decision (e.g. a 
board setting a sub-optimal remuneration scheme within a single firm (Bebchuk & Fried, 
2003)), there is growing evidence that remuneration failures are systemic. Specifically, as 
firms increasingly use benchmarking as the basis for their remuneration schemes, failures in 
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single firms (where executives leapfrog their benchmarks) quickly spread to “subsequent 
“legitimate” pay increases for others” (DiPrete, Eirich & Pittinsky, 2010:1673).  
Comments from investment banks during the crisis highlight the conditions for a similar 
effect as sector remuneration practices were embedded due to the business imperative to 
retain and attract talent. This position was evident throughout the financial sector at the time; 
for example the continued, intense “[c]ompetitive recruiting in investment banking and capital 
markets” meant that Bank of America need to take “the steps necessary to retain key talent” 
(Oppenhiem in DeCambre, 2009: para 7; for an academic perspective on the phenomena see 
Freeman, 2010; Murphy, 2009). Thus, the remuneration practices at one firm become an 
important environmental factor for competing firms, particularly when talent (or human 
capital) is central to value creation and maintaining profits. Thus, as with the norms of caveat 
emptor and ratings-reliance, so too we would propose: 
Proposition 6:  Norms surrounding remuneration practices spread through the 
financial sector with the resulting mimicry creating a positive 
feedback loop to flawed financial innovation. 
Figure 5 provides a summary of our propositions. It highlights that professional service 
firms in the financial sector (e.g. investment banks) created complex and opaque financial 
products, some of which generated fundamentally flawed transactions where parties to the 
transaction had no way of ascertaining their true risk profile. The sector norms of caveat 
emptor and  reliance on a third party (ratings agencies) coincided to allow the professional 
service firms to generate persistent above market returns from flawed financial innovation. 
These above market returns stimulated the remuneration system to induce mimicry across the 
financial sector, resulting in further flawed innovation. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 5 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
REGULATING FOR THE NEXT CRISIS, NOT THE LAST CRISIS 
We maintain that present financial regulatory responses largely ignore the key 
interaction between social norms and financial innovation we have outlined. Instead, they 
focus on traditional or standard economic assumptions in search of a universal solution. 
Current regulatory interventions aimed at improving transparency would not address the 
transaction failure we have outlined, because transparency surrounding flawed assumptions 
(e.g. market correlation factors) was already in place. Further reforms aimed at improving 
information exchange will not reduce information costs that are based on knowledge of 
flawed product calculations, particularly if the creators of innovation are motivated to exploit 
the information asymmetry.  
Instead, regulatory intervention would benefit from focusing on motivating the most 
knowledgeable parties to pass on their knowledge and assessment of the product where they 
believe it to be flawed. Without a tight focus, regulatory effort may be wasted or counter- 
productive if it does not directly address the issues of financial sector norms (e.g. see 
Australian Productivity Commission (2007) for a review of regulatory costs or Conyon et. al., 
2011 for a detailed review of the development and costs of regulating executive 
remuneration). This requires an intervention to focus on the intersection of financial 
innovation and the norms of caveat emptor and ratings reliance.  Such an approach motivates 
the person in the most knowledgeable position to be responsible for the soundness of the 
instrument, without requiring an excessive regulatory burden outside this narrow focus. In 
addition to meeting societal norms of fairness, this approach is likely to be economically 
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efficient as the search and information costs for the purchaser are prohibitive, if not 
impracticable in the circumstances outlined. In the remainder of this section, we detail a 
minimal regulatory intervention designed to curb these interactions and so address possible 
future systemic concerns (Clarke, 2004). 
Regulate the Trade, Not the Product or Trader 
Since problematic instruments (e.g. CDOs) and actors in the financial system (e.g. 
investment bankers) evolve over time, regulating either is unlikely to result in preventing 
future crises. Instead, we contend that a particular type of transaction is problematic and 
should be the focus of regulatory intervention. Regulating in this way can begin by 
differentiating between transactions that provide a material benefit for the parties to the 
transaction versus those that involve pure speculation. This requires a distinction between 
both the type of product and the nature of the trader. 
There is a fundamental difference between a real product and a synthetic product. A real 
product such as a traditional, generic financial product (e.g. mortgage or deposit) involves an 
underlying asset or cash flow backed debt from a single source. These kinds of transactions 
(which we term class one transactions) have been around for centuries and are well 
understood by market participants and most consumers. There is clear financial benefit to 
both sides of the transaction (e.g. the bank has an interest payment stream and the borrower 
has immediate access to the funds). With long-established legal principles supplemented by 
numerous consumer protections, these products do not require substantial regulatory 
intervention.  
By contrast, a synthetic product (e.g. a constructed product such as an option, credit 
default swap, futures contract or such) does not directly involve a real asset or cash flow. It is 
derived from an underlying product and is a contract backed by other real products or a 
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promise surrounding cash flows in the future that need never be executed. Since there is no 
tangible cash flow involved in the transaction, individuals can enter the trade with either a real 
or speculative intent. Traders with a real intent have some form of real interest in the subject 
matter of the transaction such that they have a material benefit even if the transaction itself 
loses. Speculative traders, on the other hand, do not have a material interest in the subject 
matter of the trade and instead the transaction amounts to speculation about the future price or 
value of the real asset(s) underlying the transaction.  
Transactions involving synthetic products and real traders (which we term a class two 
transaction) are less likely to suffer from information asymmetry. A real trader will be 
intrinsically interested in the subject matter of the trade (for example, a copper producer using 
a derivative to hedge future prices lives and breathes copper pricing) and so the transaction is 
more akin to insurance than speculation. Since a real trader is unlikely to suffer from 
information asymmetries and their downside is balanced (i.e. they gain in some other area of 
business if their position “loses”), current regulation would be sufficient. 
By contrast, speculative traders dealing with synthetic products (which we term class 
three transactions) are more susceptible to information asymmetries. They are divorced from 
the underlying cash flows and risk calculations both via the nature of the product and the 
nature of their interest. Unlike real traders, speculative traders are involved in a zero sum 
game – they will suffer loss if they are incorrect about their positions – and so the trade takes 
on the attributes of a gamble rather than a hedge. It is precisely in these situations that further 
regulation is required (see figure 6 for a diagrammatic representation). 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 6 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------- 
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In summary, neither regulating the trader (real or speculative) nor the financial 
instrument (real or synthetic) is the answer. Instead, we propose the imposition of a duty of 
care on the developer of a financial instrument at the level of a specific kind of transaction 
(i.e. the intersection of synthetic instrument and speculative trader). Since each trade has two 
parties (the buyer and the seller), it is possible that a trade could be both a class two 
transaction (if one party has a real interest in the underlying cash flow) and a class three 
transaction (if one party is a speculative trader). 
Duty of Care - A Necessary Requirement for Class Three Transactions  
Because flawed financial innovation can have substantial, negative effects on the 
financial system, it is reasonable to expect that creators and sellers of products derived from 
that innovation be held accountable for errors. Modifying the caveat emptor norm through 
regulation for class three transactions would be one possible way of achieving this aim with 
minimal impact on financial innovation. Specifically, creators and sellers of products 
involved in class three transactions would be required to notify their clients of (1) any 
material concerns they have with the product underlying the transaction, and/or (2) any 
financial involvement in the transaction (or similar transactions) that their firm holds. Both of 
these actions provide the speculative trader with improved information about the transaction 
they are about to enter at minimal cost.  
Requiring the creator to notify the transaction parties of their position and concerns with 
a product will address problematic financial products, particularly those where the creator 
knows or is recklessly ignorant that the product is likely to fail. If a transaction involves a 
product where the price is no longer a reflection of the intrinsic value of the underlying asset, 
the creator should notify the transaction parties of this point. Uncontrolled caveat emptor 
allows the creators of flawed innovation to continue their business without recourse, like Ford 
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selling Pintos they know have faulty fuel pumps. Instead, what is required are appropriate 
warnings to market participants. 
Imposing a duty of care to overcome the caveat emptor norm for class three transactions 
is more targeted than calls for fiduciary duties in client-broker relationships (e.g. Nasiripour, 
2010) or a general duty of care surrounding all financial innovation. While fiduciary duties 
and a general duty of care would result in greater disclosure and care by financiers, it may 
have an unintended effect of absolving traders of responsibility for assessing the transaction’s 
risks and stymieing financial innovation. Instead, we argue there are numerous approaches 
that could be adapted to ensure a duty of care, such as the financial advisor requirements 
under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in Australia (e.g. see s. 1022).   
Under this proposal, creators and promoters of products involving class three 
transactions only would be required to meet a duty of care surrounding the product 
underpinning that transaction. When the investor (sophisticated or not) has no material gain 
(i.e. it is not a hedge position) in a loss on a synthetic product, the individual and firm 
constructing the financial instrument would be subject to an action for negligence in cases of 
(1) misinformation or (2) insufficient disclosure or (3) inherent product design flaws. We 
acknowledge that this proposal increases uncertainty for financial innovation – but that is 
precisely the point. When dealing with untested products and clients with no interest in the 
underlying real products, financial innovators need to be aware of the deleterious effects of 
their creations and held accountable for encouraging or facilitating ignorant risk taking.  
Developing Different Sector Norms 
Other interventions that target social norms are also possible, and in this section we 
introduce some themes that could be taken up by policy makers. Since investment banks share 
the traits of professional service firms, the importance of norms is heightened as they have a 
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strong influence on market behavior (Levine & Zajac, 2007; Posner, 1997, 1998). 
Professional service firms rely on organizational culture and behavior imitation for success 
(e.g. Alchian, 1950; Schipper, 2009). Thus, another possible intervention could focus on 
mechanisms that provide for alternative norm development in the financial firms and sector 
(Sharma, 1997). “Collibration” (i.e. where government “tips the scales in the market” to 
achieve the desired regulatory outcome (Kirkbride & Letza, 2004: 89) could be used to 
encourage this through a combination of market mechanisms and state-based authority. 
Specifically, members of the profession could be accountable to a professional association or 
other authority ahead of their firm (for instance, lawyers are officers of the court first, a 
member of a firm second (e.g. s 38(1) Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld)).  This could be 
reinforced though regulation of the financial profession including specifying conduct required 
when there are conflicts of interest (e.g. in the case of lawyers, between the practitioner’s 
duties to the Court or licensing body, and their duties as director, officer or employee under 
the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)).  These issues are treated so seriously that the expected 
behaviors in the profession (or norms) are explicitly taught and reinforced as part of the 
professionalization and socialization of people joining the profession (e.g. Van den Bergh, 
2007). 
Beyond its direct impact on individual behavior, professional norms are also likely to 
become the standard by which courts judge an individual’s actions. For instance, the standard 
of what constitutes “reasonable” enquiries to be made by a banker is “current banking 
practice” (Tarr, 1980: 100). Professional standards will therefore aid improved behavior 
through a direct socialization effect within the profession and indirectly through possible 
sanctions imposed by courts. It is beyond the scope of this paper to prescribe in detail all the 
norms required nor actions that could be taken, and instead we highlight that a possible 
approach is to require that all investment bankers be members of a self-regulating 
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professional body that is supported by mandatory, legal sanctions for breaches of agreed 
behavioral standards. This body would develop and embed a series of widespread standards, 
rights and responsibilities for the profession (including rights to practice) with the aim of 
building norms that support trust in the financial markets (Aguilar, 2010).  
Re-establish the Fiduciary Duties of the Governors of Financial Entities 
Another important step that could be taken would be re-establishing basic governance 
accountability standards for the entities used to create the financial products. Quite simply, 
those in control of entities involved in the creation of complex financial products (i.e. not only 
the investment banks and trading organizations, but also the SPEs) should owe fiduciary 
duties to the entities they control. For instance, in the case of CDOs, individuals with 
responsibility for the SPEs would be accountable for the assessment of risk involved in 
developing the product on which the SPE is based.  
Furthermore, this fiduciary responsibility should be codified to reduce any erosion of 
responsibility (Alces, 2009). Current norms and law allow people who are responsible for the 
oversight of multi-million and multi-billion dollar transactions to delegate these 
responsibilities to third parties, such as credit ratings agencies. Revising regulation in this 
arena could provide that these individuals be required to bring independent consideration to 
the risks associated with the venture and product and ensure that all associated documentation 
and promotional materials reflect their conclusions. Alces (2009: 281) argues that the US has 
experienced an erosion of fiduciary duties in the corporate arena in the US that appears to 
contrast with the Australian experience of expanding fiduciary requirements. Importantly, the 
Australian example provides little evidence that increasing fiduciary obligations undermines 
competitiveness. The Australian corporate and regulatory regime is one that has survived the 
GFC better than most and is actively studied by other nations (Farrar, 2010) with economic 
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performance that leads the world (Swan, 2010). This is despite a clear historical trend to 
increase requirements of directors around solvency (s 588G Corporations Act (Cth)) and due 
care and diligence (s 181 Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)) and increasing expectations for 
directors around their fiduciary duties (e.g. Australian Securities and Investments Commission 
v Macdonald (No 11) [2009] NSWSC 287). There is also a stringent regulation of financial 
firms by the regulator, the Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), including 
independent reviews of institutional performance, mandated board performance reviews and 
interviews of directors. 
We acknowledge the difficulty this may pose for courts in determining what constitutes 
a breach and what penalty to apply, but our position is based on the underlying principle that 
uncertainty is the basis for a fiduciary duty – quite simply a fiduciary duty is not pre-specified 
in detail (Alces, 2009) in order to overcome conscious gaming. Indeed, every-day 
jurisprudence requires lawyers and judges to struggle with just such questions (Alces, 2009). 
It does not require the legislature to prescribe every kind of product and service, every 
potential action or omission and so on. This flexibility means that the system allows for the 
evolution of the norm to reflect prevailing technology and community standards.  
Embed the Change in Norms with Sanctions and Downsides 
While the preceding observations concentrate on clarifying and embedding the norms in 
the market participants from a societal perspective, our final observation concentrates on 
norms surrounding corporate incentive alignment. The Dodd-Frank Act does provide for the 
claw back of director and officer compensation, but only for egregious acts in failed 
companies (Davis Polk, 2010). While limits on compensation packages may not be justified, 
there is a clear case for ensuring incentive payments balance risk and reward for the 
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individuals; remuneration needs to involve a downside that dissuades the gaming of 
compensation systems. 
In order to strengthen the norms associated with regulation, penalties could enforce a 
forfeit of any remuneration or incentives that were based on the performance of flawed 
products or the transgression of professional standards. Under this proposal the courts could 
impose a penalty that takes into account the benefits the wrongdoer has derived from the 
action or representation. For instance, under this proposal any incentive payment paid to the 
creators, traders or promoters of the infamous ABACUS 2007-ACI transactions might be 
considered as part of a penalty (e.g. see Tarr, 2010 for the treatment of penalty provisions).  
For this provision to work best, it would need to apply to managers who allow 
subordinates to develop or sell flawed products. In these cases, if managers or supervisors met 
performance hurdles based on flawed transactions, their incentive payments would also be 
subject to a penalty imposed by a court. This system would not only dissuade those 
individuals involved in individual transactions, it would also motivate management 
throughout the organization to monitor the culture and transactions of the institution.  
CONCLUSIONS 
Current financial regulations do not explicitly address the role of social norms in the 
development of financial bubbles. In this paper we propose a model of how the social norm of 
caveat emptor encouraged the development and sale of flawed financial products. 
Additionally, the market norm of ratings agency reliance meant that little attention was paid 
to the fundamentals of these highly technical instruments – a situation remarkably similar to 
accounts of previous bubbles (e.g. Partnoy, 2009) - and mimicry in approaches to 
remuneration spread the flaws through the financial system. 
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Any response needs to address these fundamentals of human behavior and we have 
outlined the broad direction a number of regulatory interventions could take. Developing a 
duty of care for targeted transactions aims to overcome problems inherent in the exploitation 
of complex, flawed financial products. Similarly, regulating the professional conduct of 
investment bankers and the ability of governors to delegate risk assessment also addresses the 
effect of human behavior on the exploitation of flawed products by creating mechanisms by 
which their creators and sellers can be held to account. Finally, interventions on remuneration 
are designed to break the positive feedback loop between flawed product development and 
financial innovation.  
Implications for Theory 
This systemic, actor focused approach to understanding the GFC opens up a number of 
avenues for further research based on the role of norms in corporate governance. From an 
agency theory perspective, this approach reinforces the often forgotten assumption that 
markets operate within a set of social and market norms (Smith, 1776; Posner, 1997). 
Consequently, it raises many questions for agency theory itself, including the role of different 
industry or market-based norms on the behavior of directors and officers as well as the 
problems of double agency (e.g. Black, 1992) whereby the directors are acting for 
shareholders who may have different social expectations around important issues such as 
executive remuneration (Stafsudd, 2009). Changes to the power distribution around 
remuneration (e.g. the numerous “say on pay” reforms undertaken across several jurisdictions 
are aimed squarely at the double agency problem) highlight a growing recognition that 
director and shareholder norms may well diverge (Hillman, Nicholson & Shropshire, 2008). 
In short, agency theory would benefit from research aimed at understanding divergences in 
principal interest based on norms as well as self-interest with guile. 
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Other corporate governance theories may also benefit from incorporating social norms 
into their calculations. For instance, stewardship theory has proposed that managers’ actions 
are sometimes motivated by higher order needs and the desire to do a good job (e.g. Davis, 
Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). When and where do these norms prevail? Good insights 
available from the international and geographically focused governance literature (e.g. Guiso 
et al., 2004) may benefit from being extended into other contexts such as market sectors.  
Understanding norms in a market and/or industry may help develop institutional theory 
to explain how or why institutions persist in the face of contradictory forces. For instance, 
why are independent directors favored by governance codes and regulators when more than 
30 years of intensive research has failed to provide a clear link between independent directors 
and firm performance? Is this question addressed more effectively from a systemic analysis of 
power in and around institutional investors and their norms? 
Final Thoughts 
The GFC was not caused by any single market failure or event, but a systemic flaw that 
emerged from an interaction between financial innovation and the norms of the financial 
sector, particularly the norms associated with investment banking. An over-reliance on credit 
ratings agencies and an overemphasis on caveat emptor for transactions involving asymmetric 
information between parties, all reinforced with highly sensitive remuneration practices led to 
an unforeseen rise in systemic risk. Based on this analysis, we outline possible regulatory 
interventions (or formal institutions) designed to address the negative aspects of the informal 
institutions governing markets. These focus on the establishment of a professional association 
with a scrutinized regulatory function, a revision of the duty of care for directors of financial 
institutions and vehicles (such as SPEs), a statutory duty of care for the creators of innovative 
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financial products in limited circumstances, and an appropriate penalty regime where a breach 
of any of the previous three regulatory requirements is found. 
The GFC will not be the last financial bubble the world faces. Nor will these proposed 
interventions fully tame the “animal spirits” of the market (Keynes, 1936: 161). While these 
proposed interventions will benefit from further development, amendment and elaboration, 
the essence of our argument is clear. The GFC was made fundamentally worse by the 
underlying norms of a key sector in the financial community. Our proposed actions provide a 
path for addressing the cause rather than the symptoms of the GFC. 
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FIGURE 1 
The Mortgage Chain Behind the Subprime Mortgage Crisis 
 
 
 
 
Source: Cassidy (2009) 
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FIGURE 2 
Growth in subprime mortgages in the US 1996-2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: FCIC, 2011:70 
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FIGURE 3 
Diagramatic Representation of the Source of the GFC: Financial Innovation under a 
Norm of Caveat Emptor 
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FIGURE 4 
Growth in wages comparison between financial and nonfinancial sectors in the US 1928-
2009 
 
 
 
 
Source: FCIC, 2011:62
Non‐financial	
‐	$58,666 
Financial	
‐	$102,069
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FIGURE 5 
A Norms-Based Model of the Evolution of Systemic Risk in the GFC 
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FIGURE 6 
A Focus on Regulating the Transaction, Rather than the Product or Trader 
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